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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the relationship between corporate governance and audit fees during 
the period before and after the enactment of the Malaysian Code of Corporate 
Governance (MCCG). Our panel analysis of 379 firms during the 1999–2002 period 
reveals a significant and positive relationship between corporate governance and audit 
fees. However, the relationship becomes weaker after 2001, suggesting that the MCCG 
reduced firms' control and inherent risk, thus ultimately contributing to reduced audit 
effort in Malaysia. Our findings remain viable after we control for political connections 
unique to Malaysia's capital market.  
 
Keywords: Corporate governance, audit fees, corporate governance reform, political 
connection, MCCG 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate governance has been highlighted in Malaysia since the Asian Financial 
Crisis of 1997–1998. The Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange/Price Waterhouse 
(KLSE/PwC) joint survey commissioned in 1998 by Malaysia's Ministry of 
Finance found that 94% of surveyed firms desired a reform of Malaysia's 
corporate governance regime, citing the need for investors' confidence, 
transparency in directors' dealings, protection of minority shareholders, and an 
emphasis on directors' fiduciary duties. Subsequently, in 1998, the Malaysian 
Government formed the Finance Committee on Corporate Governance (FCCG). 
This committee recommended the passage of the Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance (MCCG) in 1999. After a brief 'self-regulatory' period, the MCCG 
became a part of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) Listing Rules in 
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2001. Studies, not unique to Malaysia, have shown that the enactment of 
corporate governance codes actually enhances the corporate governance 
mechanisms that firms use.  
 
In this study, we examine the relationship between corporate governance 
and audit effort, proxied by audit fees, during the 1999–2002 period. We expect a 
positive relationship between corporate governance and audit fees in the pre-
MCCG period because firms with good governance are more likely to purchase 
more audit effort. We also examine whether the relationship between corporate 
governance and audit fees holds after the MCCG reform.   
 
Our study contributes to the corporate governance and audit fees 
literature by examining a large number of corporate governance variables that are 
based on the MCCG, instead of on several individual governance variables such 
as audit committee, board structure or composition, and shareholder protection. 
We 'condense' the corporate governance variables into a single governance index 
in a manner similar to other corporate governance studies such as Gompers, Ishii 
and Metrick (2003), Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009), Klapper and Love 
(2004), Durnev and Kim (2005), and Brown and Caylor (2006). In addition, we 
examine a 'forced catalyst' to changes in firms' corporate governance structure 
(i.e., the MCCG). Because these changes may be cosmetic or 'legalistic' in some 
firms (i.e., they occur without any genuine change in corporate culture), an 
interesting question is whether audit firms price these changes.  
 
We find a positive relationship between corporate governance and audit 
fees. However, the positive slope of the association between corporate 
governance and audit fees weakens after the reform. We view this unexpected 
finding as important because it suggests that corporate governance reforms play a 
major role in increasing investor confidence and reducing the firms' perceived 
control and inherent risk. Moreover, this seems to occur at the economy-wide 
level. A 'supply-side' effect, rather than a 'demand-side' effect as in the pre-
MCCG period, seems to be the primary market force causing this slope to 
become less steep after the reform. We thus see a combination of demand- and 
supply-side effects at work in our empirical data.  
 
 
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND    
 
Corporate Governance Environment in Malaysia 
 
The MCCG is largely derived from the recommendations of the 1992 Cadbury 
Report and the 1998 Hampel Report in the United Kingdom, although the MCCG 
tends to be more regulatory driven (Ow-Yong & Kooi Guan, 2000). The MCCG 
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was first issued in March 2000. It was developed by the Working Group on Best 
Practices of Corporate Governance (JPK1) which is composed of members from 
the public and private sectors, and the Code was subsequently approved by the 
High Level Finance Committee. The MCCG formally defines corporate 
governance as: 
 
The process and structure used to direct and manage the business 
and affairs of the company towards enhancing business 
prosperity and corporate accountability with the ultimate 
objective of realizing long term shareholder value, whilst taking 
into account the interest of other stakeholders (FCCG, 1999, 
Para. 1.1, p. 52). 
 
The MCCG's recommendations are divided into four main parts: Part (1) 
Principles of Corporate Governance; Part (2) Best practice in Corporate 
Governance; Part (3) Principles and Best Practices for other corporate 
participants; and Part (4) Explanatory notes. 
 
Part (1) Principles addresses four main issues: board of directors, 
directors' remuneration; shareholders; and accountability and audit. A narrative 
statement in the annual report regarding the application of relevant principles is 
considered a sufficient disclosure from which investors can assess firms. Part (2) 
Best practices provides a set of guidelines or practices relating to the board of 
directors, accountability, and auditing concerns to assist firms in designing their 
approach to corporate governance. Compliance to Part (2) is voluntary, but firms 
are required in their annual reports to state the extent of their compliance with 
these practices and to explain any departure from them (Subramaniam et al., 
2009). Part (3) Exhortations to other participants is addressed primarily to 
institutional investors and auditors and is aimed at enhancing their role in 
corporate governance. Part (4) Explanatory notes further explains the other three 
parts.  
 
While the MCCG is intended to be a voluntary, non-statutory and self-
regulatory guide, Bursa Malaysia strengthened efforts towards enhancing 
corporate governance practices in Malaysia by integrating the Code in its Listing 
Requirements. For instance, Chapter 15 of the revamped Listing Requirements 
specifically addresses corporate governance issues; particular recommendations 
of the MCCG have now become integral parts of the revamped Bursa Listing 
Rules. Further, the listing rules require firms listed on Bursa Malaysia to state 
their extent of compliance with the MCCG, and disclosure notes are required in 
the annual reports to explain any departure from the Code. Failure by an entity to 
make the necessary disclosures and the disclosure of false information are 
considered non-compliance and punishable under the listing rules. In other 
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words, Bursa Malaysia and the MCCG have established expectations of 
accountability that include greater transparency and disclosure requirements 
(Mohd Ghazali & Weetman, 2006). 
 
 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT  
 
Academic literature presents two conflicting views on the relationship between 
corporate governance and audit fees. Tsui, Jaggi and Gul (2001), and Yatim, 
Kent and Clarkson (2006) argue that better corporate governance reduces control 
and inherent risk, and thus will reduce audit effort. This argument can be 
described as a 'supply-side' theory. Yatim et al. (2006), in accordance with 
agency theory, argue that boards that are independent from management provide 
the most effective monitoring and controlling of firm activities and most 
effectively reduce opportunistic managerial behaviour and the expropriation of 
firm resources. Knechel and Willekens (2006), consistent with a 'supply-side' 
perspective, claim that good corporate governance should improve the overall 
control environment and reduce the need for extensive external audit effort, thus 
leading to a reduction in audit fees. 
  
This 'supply-side' theory is further supported by Adams, Sherris and 
Hossain (1997) who argue that firms' audit fees will be (at least partially) 
determined by the monitoring costs of the auditor, which in turn reflect the 
internal governance mechanisms and board structure of the auditee. Audit fees 
are an important part of these monitoring costs because auditors are obligated to 
inspect accounts and to ensure that managers behave according to shareholder 
interests (Nikkinen & Sahlstrom, 2004). Bliss, Muniandy and Majid (2007) argue 
that the presence of independent directors and an audit committee reduces the 
inherent risk caused by CEO duality in Malaysia. 
 
Specifically, a stronger control and governance environment is likely to 
reduce the auditor's assessment of control risk and the extent of audit procedures, 
thus reducing audit fees. These supply-side arguments would lead, in the absence 
of strong 'demand-side' effects, to the prediction of a negative relationship 
between corporate governance and audit fees.   
  
Hay, Knechel and Ling (2008) suggest, though, that a 'demand-side' 
effect may result in a positive relationship between corporate governance and 
audit fees. They argue that audit demand is a function of the set of risks faced by 
an organisation's individual stakeholders and the set of control mechanisms 
available for mitigating these risks. Because individual decisions about control 
processes and procedures may shift benefits and costs across groups of 
stakeholders, the net investment in auditing may increase when multiple 
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stakeholders become involved in corporate governance decisions. For instance, 
the audit cost is more likely to be borne by equity shareholders who may have 
little say in determining the extent of audit work undertaken (Carcello, 
Hermanson, Neal, & Riley, 2002; Hay et al., 2008). Hay et al. (2008) explain that 
while the presence of a major shareholder in a firm could result in higher audit 
fees, an increase in audit fees could also result from the demand by minority 
shareholders for more audit effort as a protection against exploitation from the 
major shareholder.  
 
Similarly, Carcello et al. (2002), Abbott, Parker, Peters and Raghunandan 
(2003), Fan and Wong (2005), and Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2006) argue that 
the demand for stronger corporate governance induces the auditee to seek out 
better auditing and internal control. In other words, because good governance is 
valued by the firm's stakeholders, it chooses to purchase higher quality audit 
services and thus is charged higher audit fees. For example, Mitra et al. (2007) 
argue that high agency costs might result in better corporate governance. Under 
these circumstances, stakeholders will demand a better audit.   
 
O'Sullivan (2000), Carcello et al. (2002), and Salleh, Stewart and 
Manson (2006) argue on the basis of board independence. They argue that if the 
board has a high level of independence—as suggested by the number of 
independent non-executive directors either on the board of directors or on other 
boards (e.g., remuneration, nomination and audit committees)—it will demand 
more audit effort. Carcello et al. (2002) further argue that the higher demand for 
audit effort results from directors seeking liability protection by protecting their 
reputation as monitors. Furthermore, independent directors tend not to have 
psychological ties with companies because, unlike executive directors, they are 
not financially dependent upon the company. As such, these directors should be 
more willing to question management's decisions and arguably reduce bias in the 
reporting of the entity's financial results (Beasley et al., 2000). 
  
O'Sullivan (2000) argues that non-executive directors are expected to 
favour more extensive auditing to complement their own monitoring 
responsibilities. Similarly, Abbott et al. (2003) contend that an audit committee 
could expand the audit's scope to avoid being associated with financial 
misstatements. These 'demand-side' theories all clearly suggest a positive 
relationship between corporate governance and audit fees. We contend that the 
demand-side arguments are theoretically stronger and more convincing than the 
supply-side arguments. Furthermore, previous research results provide stronger 
support for a positive relationship. These conclusions support the theory that 
demand-side effects dominate supply-side effects. Therefore, we posit the 
following hypothesis (in alternate form): 
 
Effiezal Aswadi Abdul Wahab et al. 
6 
H1: There is a positive relationship between the level of 
corporate governance and audit fees. 
 
Examining the effects of numerous corporate governance variables on audit fees 
yields contrasting results. Carcello et al. (2002), O'Sullivan (2000), and Salleh et 
al. (2006) find that various board characteristics positively affect audit fees. In 
contrast, Tsui et al. (2001) find that corporate governance provides a better 
control and governance environment and leads to lower audit fees. 
 
In 2001, Malaysia experienced a corporate governance reform whereby 
the MCCG became a part of the KLSE Listing Requirements. Part (3), Paragraph 
IV of the MCCG states: ''The external auditors should independently report to 
shareholders in accordance with statutory and professional requirements and 
independently assure the board on the discharge of its responsibility.'' Part (4) of 
the MCCG further explains that the role of external auditors is to ensure that the 
firm presents a balanced and understandable assessment of the firm's position 
(Part 4, Section D, Para 4.13) and maintains sound internal control (Part 4, 
Section D, Para. 4.14). 
 
Extant academic literature frequently models audit fees as a function of 
the application of audit efforts and the extent of the auditor's legal liability 
(Simunic, 1980). Because of the MCCG's Part 1 requirements and other statutory 
requirements that demand an increase in audit effort, a growing consensus 
emerges that audit fees are expected to increase following the introduction of the 
MCCG (Griffin & Lont, 2007; Mohd Salman & Carson, 2009). We next will 
discuss how we expect the association between corporate governance and audit 
fees to systematically alter post-MCCG. Griffin and Lont (2007), and Ghosh and 
Pawlewicz (2008) find that audit fees in the United States increased following the 
enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. On the basis of the arguments 
presented above, we predict the following hypothesis (in alternate form): 
 
H2:  There is a positive relationship between the introduction of 
the MCCG and audit fees. 
 
We also examine the joint impact of corporate governance and reform on audit 
fees because corporate governance forms an integral part of the MCCG. Past 
studies (Abdul Wahab, How, & Verhoeven, 2007; Kouwenberg, 2006) suggest 
that the introduction of a corporate governance code improves firms' overall 
corporate governance structure. According to demand-side logic, the MCCG 
should raise awareness in the business community of the need for good firm 
governance. The expectation that the slope will become more positive after the 
reform is based on 'demand-side' arguments. This belief suggests that 
stakeholders, being more aware after the reform of the need for effective 
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corporate governance, choose to purchase more audit effort per unit of increase in 
corporate governance than they previously did. This belief could also indicate 
that audit firms extract more monopoly rents after the reform by raising audit 
fees, independently of audit effort, at a higher rate per unit increase in corporate 
governance. Either or both of these effects could be occurring. This leads to the 
following hypothesis H3 (in alternate form): 
 
H3: The positive relationship between the level of corporate 
governance and audit fees is stronger after the introduction 
of MCCG. 
 
 
DATA AND RESEARCH METHODS 
 
The panel data set (unbalanced) includes 379 non-financial firms for four years 
from 1999 to 2002. The chosen time period allows for a two-year period before 
and after the 2001 MCCG. Data for corporate governance variables are hand 
collected from annual reports, which are available from Bursa Malaysia 
(www.bursamalaysia.com) and Mergent Online databases. Consistent with other 
audit studies, we exclude from our sample financial firms and firms with negative 
equity. Meanwhile, the audit fees data are collected from two sources: Compustat 
Global and annual reports. The remaining data are collected from Mergent 
Online, Compustat Global and DataStream databases and Stock Performance 
Guide. This study uses period seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) to handle 
both heterocedasticity and contemporaneous correlations in each cross-section. 
We posit the following audit fees model (showing the experimental variables in 
bold type):   
 
LAFit = a0INTERCEPTit + a1CGOVit + a2REFORMit + 
a3CGOV*REFORMit + a4LNASSETSit + 
a5INSTOWNit + a6LNSUBSit + a7LNFOREIGNit + 
a8CURRENTit + a9LIQUIDit + a10DEBTit + a11ROAit + 
a12LOSSit + a13INDUSTRYit + a14AUDITit + 
a15POLITICit + eit 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
Because most audit fees models use the logarithmic transformation of audit fees 
as the dependent variable, the tests in this study are conducted using logarithmic 
transformation as the dependent variable (LAF). We use audit fees because we 
are interested in knowing the extent of auditor investigation. It is reasonable to 
assume that more investigation will require more audit hours and/or the use of a 
more specialised audit staff, resulting in higher audit fees (O'Sullivan, 2000). 
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Furthermore, the use of audit fees as a proxy for audit quality would be 
appropriate because audit quality is unobservable (O'Sullivan, 2000). The auditor 
or the auditee can initiate more (or less) audit effort and higher (or lower) fees.  
 
Experimental Variables 
 
The corporate governance index (CGOV), obtained from Abdul Wahab et al. 
(2007), is constructed using Part 2 and Part 4 of the MCCG's new disclosure rules 
and consists of 30 governance-related variables. The first part (MCCG_PT2) 
relates primarily to compliance with the governance practices enumerated in the 
MCCG's Part 2, Best practices. The second part (MCCG_PT4) relates to 
disclosures of the governance practices recommended in the MCCG's Part 4, 
Explanatory notes. To find the impact of the 2001 corporate governance reform, 
we also construct a dummy variable (REFORM) that takes a value of 'one' for the 
post-2001 period and a value of 'zero' otherwise. We also create an interaction 
variable (CGOV*REFORM) to discover the incremental impact of corporate 
governance on audit fees as a result of the MCCG's passage.  
 
Control Variables 
 
Because the natural log transformation of total assets (LNASSETS) is generally 
regarded as an important determinant for variation of audit fees (Hay, Knechel, & 
Wang, 2006), we allow it to proxy for firm size. We posit a positive relationship 
between firm size and audit fees. Larger firms are more complex which requires 
more audit effort and results in higher audit fees (Simunic, 1980; Francis, 1984). 
We control for ownership structure by incorporating institutional ownership 
(INSTOWN). We argue that the presence in firms of institutional investors 
increases the level of monitoring (Brickley, Lease, & Clifford, 1988; Cornett, 
Marcus, Saunders, & Tehranian, 2007) and that these firms require more audit 
effort from the auditors. As such, we posit a positive relationship between 
institutional ownership and audit fees (Kane & Velury, 2004). Equally important, 
we account for the natural log transformation of total subsidiaries (LNSUBS) and 
foreign subsidiaries (LNFOREIGN) to control further for audit complexity 
(Simunic, 1980; Hackenbrack & Knechel, 1997). 
 
We also include the ratio of current assets to total assets (CURRENT) to 
control for inherent risk. We predict a positive relationship between CURRENT 
and audit fees because certain parts of the audit may have a higher risk of error 
and require specialised audit procedures (Simunic, 1980). Liquidity is controlled 
for by including the working capital ratio, represented by the ratio of current 
assets to current liabilities (LIQUID). Furthermore, we include the debt ratio, 
represented by the ratio of total debt to total equity (DEBT). 
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We include return on assets (ROA) as a proxy for profitability. We 
predict a negative relationship between ROA and audit fees. Firms with a low 
ROA require more audit effort, and auditor liability is a more pressing concern in 
such cases. In addition, we include a dummy for firms that recorded a loss 
(LOSS) in the year preceding the prediction of a positive relationship.  
  
Finally, industry dummies that take a value of 'one' for firms belonging to 
the construction (CONSTRUCTION), consumer (CONSUMER), high technology 
(TECHNOLOGY), and other (OTHER) sectors and take a value of 'zero' 
otherwise are included to control for variations in audit fees across industries. 
Conventional wisdom demonstrates that some industries are more difficult and 
more labour-intensive to audit (Simunic, 1980; Turpen, 1990; Pearson & 
Tormpeter, 1994). We include a dummy variable for Big 'n' auditing firms 
(AUDIT) to control for differences in audit quality. We assume that auditees 
associated with large auditing firms purchase the highest quality audits (Carcello 
et al., 2002).  
 
We extend the analysis by including political connection, an attribute that 
is unique to Malaysia (Gul, 2006). Gul provides empirical evidence to support the 
proposition that auditors perceive greater inherent risk in politically connected 
firms. This perception leads to greater audit effort, and greater audit effort leads 
to higher fees. Gul suggests that this greater inherent risk exists because these 
firms have a higher probability of their business failing and because they are 
more likely to misstate their financial health in their financial statements to avoid 
covenant violations. Gul documents evidence of crony-capitalism in Malaysia by 
demonstrating that there was a comparatively greater increase in audit fees for 
politically connected firms following the Asian Financial Crisis and that the audit 
fees for firms declined following the government's introduction of capital 
controls to help its preferred firms. On the basis of the arguments presented 
above, we posit a positive relationship between politically connected firms 
(POLITIC) and audit fees. We derive our list of political connections from the 
following sources: Johnson and Mitton (2003), Mohamad, Hassan and Chen 
(2006), and the Khazanah Nasional Berhad website (www.khazanah.com.my).  
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Table 1 
Definition and expected direction of variables 
 
No. Variables Sign Definition Source 
1 LAF  Natural logarithm of audit 
fees. 
Annual reports and 
Compustat Global. 
Panel A: Experimental Variables  
2 CGOV + Corporate Governance  Abdul Wahab et al. (2007) 
3 REFORM + An indicator variable, 1 
for years 2001 and 2002. 
– 
4 CGOV*REFORM – An interaction variable 
between corporate 
governance and the 
reform period. 
– 
Panel B: Client Attributes  
5 LNASSETS + Natural logarithm of total 
assets. 
DataStream, Compustat 
Global and Stock 
Performance Guide. 
6 INSTOWN + Top five institutional 
shareholdings in each 
firm. 
Annual reports. 
7 LNSUBS + Natural logarithm of 
number of subsidiaries. 
Mergent Online and 
Annual Reports. 
8 LNFOREIGN + Natural logarithm of 
number of foreign 
subsidiaries. 
Mergent Online and 
Annual Reports. 
9 CURRENT + Current assets to total 
assets. 
DataStream, Compustat 
Global and Stock 
Performance Guide. 
10 ROA – Net profit before tax over 
total assets. 
DataStream, Compustat 
Global and Stock 
Performance Guide. 
11 LOSS + An indicator variable, 1 
for loss in the last year. 
DataStream, Compustat 
Global and Stock 
Performance Guide.  
12 LIQUID – Current assets to current 
liabilities. 
DataStream, Compustat 
Global and Stock 
Performance Guide. 
13 DEBT + Total debt to total equity.  DataStream, Compustat 
Global and Stock 
Performance Guide. 
 
(continued) 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
No. Variables Sign Definition Source 
14 INDUSTRY ? Industry dummies that 
take a value of one for 
firms belonging to the 
construction 
(CONSTRUCTION), 
consumer (CONSUMER), 
high technology 
(TECHNOLOGY) and 
other (OTHER) sectors 
and zero otherwise. 
Bursa Malaysia's website. 
Panel C: Auditor Attribute   
15 AUDIT + An indicator variable, 1 
for Big 'n' audit firms. 
Annual reports and 
Compustat Global. 
Panel D: Country Attributes   
16 POLITIC + An indicator variable, 1 
for politically-connected 
firms. 
Johnson and Mitton 
(2003), Mohamad et al. 
(2006) and Khazanah 
Berhad website 
(www.khazanah.gov.my). 
 
Descriptive Statistics  
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for this study. Ringgit Malaysia (RM) 
275,700 (RM110,000) with a range between RM500 and RM9.4 million 
represents the average (median) audit fees for the sample firms. The main 
measure for corporate governance (CGINDEX) records a mean (median) of 
37.690 (36.607) with a maximum score of 79.911. MCCG_PT2 and MCCG_PT4 
record respective means (medians) of 41.859 (31.250) and 33.520 (35.714). Our 
list shows that 20.9% of the sample firms are politically connected. The mean 
(median) for total assets (ASSETS) is RM1.876 billion (RM608.6 million), while 
the top five institutional investors' shareholdings (INSTOWN) average 12.100%. 
The number of subsidiaries (SUBS) averages 29.000 with a range between 0 and 
407 subsidiaries, while firms average 6.700 foreign subsidiaries (FOREIGN). The 
mean (median) for CURRENT is 0.347 (0.251), while the mean (median) for 
ROA is 5.836% (5.267%). For the past fiscal year, 18.4% of the sample firms 
recorded a loss. LIQUID and DEBT average 3.648 and 1.773, respectively.  
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics for sample firms (1999–2002) 
 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
AF(‘000) 275.70 110.00 9400.00 0.500 664.60 
LAF 11.733 11.617 16.056 8.517 1.121 
Experimental Variables 
CGINDEX 37.690 36.607 79.911 0.000 18.310 
MCCG_PT2 41.859 31.250 87.500 0.000 19.617 
MCCG_PT4 33.520 35.714 78.571 0.000 19.133 
ASSETS (‘000) 1,876,000 608,600 61,770,000 465.10 4,975,000 
LNASSETS 20.387 20.227 24.847 15.353 1.273 
INSTOWN 12.100 5.830 90.553 0.000 16.944 
CURRENT 0.347 0.343 1.000 0.000 0.205 
LIQUID 3.648 1.596 195.090 –59.982 12.534 
SUBS 29.000 15.000 407.000 0.000 43.977 
LNSUBS 1.313 2.708 6.009 –11.513 4.584 
FOREIGN 6.700 2.000 224.000 0.000 17.577 
LNFOREIGN –3.304 0.693 5.412 –11.513 6.390 
DEBT 1.773 0.517 37.463 0.000 3.798 
ROA 5.836 5.267 140.162 –88.504 11.776 
LOSS 0.173 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.378 
AUDIT 0.703 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.457 
POLITIC 0.209 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.407 
 
Note: Observations having a zero for LNSUBS or for LNFOREIGN are re-coded to a small positive (0.0001) to 
enable a logarithmic transformation. 
 
AF is audit fees while LAF is natural logarithm of audit fees. CGINDEX is a 
composite measure of the MCCG. MCCG_PT2 is a composite measure of 
corporate governance based on Part 2 of the MCCG, which requires firms to 
explain and provide alternative practices adopted when departing from best 
practices. MCCG_PT4 is a composite measure of corporate governance based on 
Part 4 of the MCCG, which provides explanatory notes to the principles and best 
practices. ASSETS is total assets while LNASSETS is natural log transformation of 
ASSETS. INSTOWN is the percentage shareholdings by top five institutional 
investors. CURRENT is current assets to total assets. LIQUID is current assets to 
current liabilities. SUBS is the number of subsidiaries while LNSUBS is the 
natural log transformation of SUBS. FOREIGN presents the number of foreign-
domicile subsidiaries and LNFOREIGN is the natural log transformation of 
FOREIGN. DEBT is total debt over total equity. ROA is earnings divided by total 
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assets. LOSS takes the value of 1 if the firm recorded a loss in the previous fiscal 
year. AUDIT takes the value of 1 for Big 'n' auditors and zero otherwise. 
POLITIC takes the value of 1 for politically-connected firms and zero otherwise. 
 
 
RESULTS  
 
Univariate Analysis 
 
Table 3 reports the correlations between the variables during the test period. 
Furthermore, Table 4 reports the differences in the means and medians for the 
test variables between the pre- and post-test period. Because the univariate 
analyses include both continuous and dichotomous variables, both t-tests and chi-
square tests are used (as appropriate) to test for differences. We observe no 
significant difference in audit fees (LAF) before and after the corporate 
governance reforms. As expected, the sample firms' various measures of 
corporate governance (CGOV) record significantly higher scores for the 2001–
2002 period. Corporate governance generally improves after 2001, but we cannot 
conclusively determine the extent to which the MCCG affected this 
improvement. Corporate governance improvement is partially demand driven. 
Individual firms respond to greater demand for corporate governance on the part 
of their stakeholders. Before the reforms, the sample firms had significantly 
bigger size (ASSETS) and a higher return on assets (ROA). 
 
Pearson (in shaded) and Spearman Rank correlations are reported in the 
table. LAF is natural logarithm of audit fees. CGINDEX is a composite measure 
of the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG). POLITIC takes the 
value of 1 for politically-connected firms and zero otherwise. ASSETS is total 
assets. INSTOWN is the percentage shareholdings by top five institutional 
investors. LNSUBS is the natural log transformation of subsidiaries while 
LNFOREIGN presents the natural log transformation of foreign-domicile 
subsidiaries. CURRENT is current assets to total assets. ROA is earnings divided 
by total assets. LOSS takes the value of 1 if the firm recorded a loss in the 
previous fiscal year. LIQUID is current assets to current liabilities. DEBT is total 
debt over total equity. AUDIT takes the value of 1 for Big 'n' auditors and zero 
otherwise. *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively.  
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AF is audit fees while LAF is natural logarithm of audit fees. CGINDEX 
is a composite measure of the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 
(MCCG). MCCG_PT2 is a composite measure of corporate governance based on 
Part 2 of the MCCG, which requires firms to explain and provide alternative 
practices adopted when departing from best practices. MCCG_PT4 is a 
composite measure of corporate governance based on Part 4 of the MCCG, which 
provides explanatory notes to the principles and best practices. ASSETS is total 
assets while LNASSETS is natural log transformation of ASSETS. INSTOWN is 
the percentage shareholdings by top five institutional investors. SUBS is the 
number of subsidiaries while LNSUBS is the natural log transformation of SUBS. 
FOREIGN presents the number of foreign-domicile subsidiaries and 
LNFOREIGN is the natural log transformation of FOREIGN. CURRENT is 
current assets to total assets. ROA is earnings divided by total assets. LOSS takes 
the value of 1 if the firm recorded a loss in the previous fiscal year. LIQUID is 
current assets to current liabilities. DEBT is total debt over total equity. AUDIT 
takes the value of 1 for Big 'n' auditors and zero otherwise. POLITIC takes the 
value of 1 for politically-connected firms and zero otherwise. Significant p-values 
are in bolds. The figures in parentheses denote Chi-square statistics.  
 
Multivariate Analysis 
 
Table 5 shows the panel least squares results. Column 1 presents our tabulated 
result for the basic audit fees model (calculated using all variables less 
experimental variables). These calculations indicate that the variables are as 
predicted and significant with the exception of several client attribute variables. 
We observe positive and significant intercepts or constant terms across all model 
specifications, which indicate fixed costs in setting up and conducting an audit, 
regardless of the attributes captured by other variables (Pong & Whittington, 
1994). 
 
As expected, we find natural logarithm of audit fees (LAF) to be 
positively and significantly related to firm size (LNASSETS), institutional 
ownership (INSTOWN), and a factor of audit complexity (LNFOREIGN). We 
find evidence to support the proposition that the ratio of current assets to total 
assets (CURRENT) is associated with the variation in audit fees. Finally, our 
basic audit fees model shows no relationship between the auditor's attribute 
(AUDIT) and audit fees. Our adjusted R-square for the basic model is 63.5%. 
 
We extend the basic audit fees model by including the experimental 
variables as presented in Columns 2 through 6 of Table 5. Hypothesis 1 predicts a 
positive relationship between corporate governance and audit fees. As predicted, 
we find that the coefficient for our main measure of corporate governance 
(CGINDEX) is positive and significant (0.017, t = 2.934, p < 0.01), thus 
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indicating that, on average, better overall corporate governance is associated with 
stakeholders also demanding more audit effort. This demand ultimately increases 
audit fees. The result supports a 'demand-side' argument.  
 
Hypothesis 2 expects a positive relationship between the introduction of 
the MCCG and audit fees. Our results confirm our expectation; the coefficient for 
(REFORM) is positive and significant (0.307, t = 2.934, p < 0.01). The results 
suggest that the Bursa Listing requirements and the introduction of the MCCG 
have instigated greater audit effort and thus have increased the audit fees being 
paid to external auditors. 
 
The interaction variable (CGOV*REFORM) examining the impact of 
corporate governance during the 2001–2002 period has a negative and significant 
coefficient here (–0.013, t = – 2.146, p < 0.05). Because the CGINDEX variable 
has a positive effect on audit fees, the negative coefficient for the interaction 
variable suggests a less positive relationship between corporate governance and 
audit fees after the enactment of the MCCG in 2001. This result contradicts our 
prior expectations, which were based exclusively on demand-side arguments.  
 
Our interaction results suggest that the MCCG has lowered auditors' 
overall assessments of inherent and control risks for Malaysian firms and has led 
to reduced audit effort. Post-reform analysis shows a smaller increase in audit 
effort and audit fees for every unit increase in corporate governance. Thus, a 
supply-side effect is operating after the reform. These effects exist in addition to 
the demand-side effects confirmed by our empirical testing of the demand-based 
hypotheses H1 and H2. The MCCG seems to be an effective economy-wide 
signalling mechanism; auditors are more willing to rely on corporate governance 
improvements after the governance reform. This reliance on corporate 
governance in turn reduces external audit effort. Our result is similar to Goddard 
and Masters' (2000) examination of the Cadbury Codes, who find a reduction in 
audit fees after the implementation of the code because of increased assessment 
of internal controls. Although this result suggests that better corporate 
governance provides better control and reduces risk (Yatim et al., 2006), the audit 
discount is only 1.29%. In other words, the economic impact on reduction of 
audit fees is minimal. The remaining interaction variables, with the exception of 
MCCG_PT4 and QUANTITY, also have negative and significant coefficients. The 
remaining control variables remain similar to Column 1 of Table 5, further 
supporting the robustness of the initial audit fees model. 
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Table 5 
Panel least squares estimation of audit fees (1999–2002) 
 
 
(continued) 
 
 
 
Expected 
direction 
LAF LAF LAF LAF 
1 2 3 4 
INTERCEPT + 3.446 2.974 2.855 3.221 
  4.620*** 3.958*** 3.800*** 4.293*** 
Experimental Variables      
CGINDEX +  0.017   
   2.934***   
MCCG_PT2 +   0.016  
    3.242***  
MCCG_PT4 +    0.006 
     1.487 
REFORM +  0.307 0.444 0.087 
   1.730*** 2.764*** 0.500 
CGINDEX*(REFORM) -  –0.013   
   –2.146**   
MCCG_PT2*(REFORM) -   –0.014  
    –2.680***  
MCCG_PT4*(REFORM) -    –0.003 
     –0.542 
LNASSETS + 0.411 0.411 0.414 0.411 
  11.888*** 11.948*** 12.036*** 11.889*** 
INSTOWN + 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 
  3.642*** 3.343*** 3.481*** 3.460*** 
      
CURRENT + 0.751 0.739 0.735 0.745 
  3.972*** 3.935*** 3.916*** 3.949*** 
LIQUID + –0.016 –0.016 –0.016 –0.016 
  –5.332*** –5.248*** –5.232*** –5.349*** 
LNSUBS + 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.013 
  1.465 1.298 1.242 1.351 
LNFOREIGN + 0.031 0.033 0.032 0.033 
  4.340*** 4.554*** 4.524*** 4.517*** 
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Table 5 (continued) 
 
 
Country attribute 
 
Country attribute results reported in Table 5 reveal that the politically connected 
firms' (POLITIC) coefficient is positive and significant. This result is consistent 
with Gul's (2006) suggestion that politically connected firms present more audit 
risk, and it supports demand-based arguments. Stakeholders, being aware of a 
firm's political connections, seem willing and able to pay higher audit fees for 
such auditees so that more audit effort can be applied. Stakeholders seem very 
'aware' of political connections and use the external audit mechanism to partially 
compensate for the negative effects of political connection. Audit fees may be 
higher, though, independently of audit effort because political connections allow 
for wealth transfers between the auditee and the auditor. Under this interpretation, 
Big 'n' firms opportunistically 'trade on' political connections when they operate 
in Malaysia by extracting a higher fee from the politically connected firms. 
'Crony capitalism' would, according to this explanation, also extend to the Big 'n' 
auditors' Malaysian operations. The parameter of 0.173 (Column 2) for POLITIC 
suggests an audit fees premium of 18.86%.  
 
LAF is natural logarithm of audit fees. CGINDEX is a composite measure 
of the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG). MCCG_PT2 is a 
 
Expected 
direction 
LAF LAF LAF LAF 
1 2 3 4 
DEBT + –0.013 –0.012 –0.012 –0.012 
  –1.694* –1.511 –1.590 –1.574 
ROA – 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 
  0.845 1.133 1.142 1.160 
LOSS + 0.084 0.089 0.091 0.092 
  1.110 1.188 1.214 1.215 
AUDIT + 0.038 0.046 0.050 0.045 
  0.475 0.574 0.625 0.560 
POLITIC + 0.158 0.173 0.172 0.165 
  1.553 1.704* 1.697* 1.627 
Industry fixed ? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared  63.5 65.5 65.3 67.3 
F-statistic  72.549*** 61.649*** 61.884*** 60.850*** 
Cross-sections  379 379 379 379 
Total observations  1182 1182 1182 1182 
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composite measure of corporate governance based on Part 2 of the MCCG, which 
requires firms to explain and provide alternative practices adopted when 
departing from best practices. MCCG_PT4 is a composite measure of corporate 
governance based on Part 4 of the MCCG, which provides explanatory notes to 
the principles and best practices. LNASSETS is natural log transformation of total 
assets. INSTOWN is the percentage shareholdings by top five institutional 
investors. CURRENT is current assets to total assets. LIQUID is current assets to 
current liabilities. LNSUBS is the log transformation of number of subsidiaries 
while LNFOREIGN presents the log transformation of number of foreign-
domicile subsidiaries. DEBT is total debt over total equity. ROA is earnings 
divided by total assets. LOSS takes the value of 1 if the firm recorded a loss in the 
previous fiscal year. AUDIT takes the value of 1 for Big 'n' auditors and zero 
otherwise. POLITIC takes the value of 1 for politically-connected firms and zero 
otherwise. t-statistics are italicised. *, ** and *** denote significance level at 
10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The results of previous research examining the relationship between corporate 
governance and audit fees have been inconclusive and conflicting. Our initial 
finding suggests that audit fees are positively and significantly related to 
corporate governance. However, we find a less positive relationship between 
corporate governance and audit fees after 2001, on the basis of the interaction of 
post-MCCG dummy and corporate governance. This finding suggests, consistent 
with 'supply-side' explanations, that the MCCG, in combination with actual 
corporate governance changes by firms, reduces the perception of risk and 
enhances firms' control. These shifts ultimately reduce audit effort. Our study is 
consistent with Goddard and Masters' (2000) examination of the impact of the 
Cadbury Code on audit fees. Further, our findings remain the same after 
controlling for political connections that could impact the price of audit services.  
 
The present study has a number of limitations that provide opportunities 
for further research. First, similarly to the caveat given in Gul (2006), our study 
acknowledges that our list of politically connected firms depends on Johnson and 
Mitton (2003). Further research should measure political connection variables 
using a different method. Sociological research on Malaysia may lead to a more 
informed and nuanced measurement of political connection. In addition, this 
study only focuses on political connection as a country-specific attribute. Other 
proxies such as ethnicity and family companies may be more suitable as 
attributes for the Malaysian environment. 
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Future research should examine extensively the nature of CGOV factors 
and their relation to audit fees. Examples of CGOV factors include the activities 
carried out by audit committees and directors' relationships with major 
shareholders. Furthermore, a longitudinal study, expanding more than five years 
before and after the introduction of the MCCG, would be beneficial in measuring 
the long term impact of governance on audit fees. 
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NOTES 
 
1. The main purpose of the joint KLSE/Price Waterhouse Corporate Governance survey 
was to improve the corporate governance framework and ensure companies conduct 
their businesses with the highest possible standard of 'best practices'. 
2. Examples of studies include Abdul Wahab et al. (2007) for Malaysia; McKnight, 
Milonas, Tcarlos and Weir (2005) for the United Kingdom; Aggarwal and 
Williamson (2006) for the United States; and Kouwenberg (2006) for Thailand. 
3. A review of literature indicates that a number of studies examine the relationships 
between corporate governance, ethnicity, political connection and audit fees of the 
listed Malaysian firms (Yatim et al., 2006; Gul, 2006; Abdul Wahab, Mat Zain, 
James, & Haron, 2009). However, most of these studies assess the corporate 
governance impact on audit fees using an individual corporate governance measure 
rather than a composite corporate governance index. 
4. Apart from corporate governance, institutional investors and auditors' responsibility 
are mentioned in Part 3 of the MCCG. 
5. The seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) method—also known as the multivariate 
regression, or Zellner's method—estimates the parameters of the system, accounting 
for heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation in the errors across 
equations. The estimates of the cross-equation covariance matrix are based on 
parameter estimates of the unweighted system. 
6. Please see Appendix A for a detailed explanation of the construction of CGINDEX. 
7. We have based our choice of variables on the work of Hay et al. (2006). We would 
like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
8. Regression results are reported without the industry dummies. The results that 
include the industry dummies can be obtained from the corresponding author. 
9. The Big 'n' audit firms are Arthur Andersen, Deloitte, KPMG, Ernst and Young, and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. For the sake of consistency, well-known partner firms 
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(e.g., Kassim Chan and Hanafiah Raslan) to the Big 'n' are classified as Big auditors 
if they are mentioned explicitly. Transitional audit firms during the Arthur Andersen 
saga are not classified as Big 'n' audit firms. 
10. Khazanah Nasional Berhad is the Malaysian government's investment holding arm 
and manages its commercial assets. It was incorporated in September 1993 and 
began operations in 1994. It is structured as a holding company that is a wholly 
controlled entity of the Malaysian government's Ministry of Finance (MOF). 
11. Our adjusted R-square is comparable to other Malaysian audit studies (e.g., Gul 
(2006) at 61.6% and Salleh et al. (2006) at 62.5%). 
12. Because this is an interaction variable, the interpretation of the negative coefficient 
must consider the other 'stand-alone' variables (CGINDEX and REFORM). The 
positive slope of CGINDEX demonstrates that the inclusion of REFORM has 
weakened the positive slope documented earlier by CGINDEX. 
13. The audit fee premium or discount is obtained by calculating the effect of the 
percentage shift on natural log of audit fees and is defined as ez – 1, where z is the 
parameter for the testable variable. See Craswell et al. (1995) for a thorough 
explanation. 
14. Politically connected firms have a mean LAF of 11.991. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Individual Factors of CGINDEX 
 
CGINDEX is the composite measure of corporate governance based on the MCCG.  
MCCG_PT2 is a composite measure of corporate governance index based on Part 2 of 
MCCG, which requires firms to explain and provide alternative practices adopted when 
departing from best practices.  MCCG_PT4 is a composite measure of corporate 
governance index based on Part 4 of MCCG, which provides further best practices and 
explanatory notes to the principles and best practises set out in Parts 1 and 2. BOARD is 
board of director and composition, AUD_ACC is accountability and audit, and SHA is 
shareholders protection and communication. 
 
1999–2002 
FACTORS REFERENCES 
MCCG_PT2 
BOD_001 Does the company split the Chairman and CEO/Managing Director posts? Section AA, Paragraph II 
BOD_002 Does the company comply with MCCG recommendation on the proportion of independent directors on the board? Section AA, Paragraph III 
BOD_003 Is the frequency of board of directors' meetings disclosed? Section AA, Paragraph XIV 
NOM_001 Does the company have a nomination committee? Section AA, Paragraph VIII 
NOM_004 Are the majority of directors on the nomination committee independent? Section AA, Paragraph VIII 
NOM_003 Does the CEO not sit on the nomination committee? Section AA, Paragraph VIII 
NOM_008 Does the company disclose recommendations made by the nomination committee? Section AA, Paragraph VIII 
NOM_009 Does the company disclose methods of board appointments? Section AA, Paragraph X 
REM_001 Does the company have a remuneration committee? Section AA, Paragraph XXIV 
REM_002 Is the list of remuneration committee members disclosed? Section AA, Paragraph XXIV 
REM_003 Does the CEO not sit on the remuneration committee?  Section AA, Paragraph XXIV 
REM_004 Are the majority of directors on the remuneration committee independent? 
Section AA, Paragraph 
XXIV 
REM_009 Does the company disclose recommendations made by the remuneration committee? 
Section AA, Paragraph 
XXIV 
AA_001 Are the majority of directors on the audit committee independent? Section BB, Paragraph I 
AA_002 Does the company disclose activities carried out by the audit committee? Section BB, Paragraph II 
AA_003 Does the company disclose a statement on internal control? Section BB, Paragraph VII 
 
